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Abstract  
This study explores the value implications of good corporate governance for a sample of 54 ADR issuing emerging market firms (EMFs) from 9 countries primarily 
located in the regions of Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America and the and employs recently constructed company composite corporate governance metric along with some 
alternative corporate governance measures associated with the origin of the issuing firm. Although the ADR literature primarily focuses on the impact of subscription to US 
disclosure requirements we contend that company and country specific corporate governance standards play a significant role in the risk reduction and ensuing value capture.  
The fundamental inquiry in this study has the following foci: The primary focus is on the impact of corporate governance structures on firm performance as to whether 
adherence to standards creates market value for ADR issuing EMFs.  Do good corporate governance practices affect the value of EMFs? The secondary focus is concerned with 
whether the impact of corruption level and legal system in a firm’s home country affect the corporate structures of EMFs thus affecting the market value of firms.  In this study, 
we utilize Tobin’s q as the measure of firm performance/market value.  Our findings suggest that there is a significant correlation between corporate governance structures of 
ADR issuing EMFs and their market values and/or performances.  The results also indicate that the level of corruption and legal structures in home countries of EMFs strongly 
impact the corporate governance structures of these firms and sequentially affect their market values. Therefore, this research further contributes to the scholarly findings and 
suppositions that corporate structures of firms do create consequences on firm value. 
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I. Introduction	  
Asymmetric information in financial 
markets is a taxing problem. An impediment to 
capital allocation is implicit in situations, which a 
capital user knows far more about his/her prospects 
and problems than the supplier of the capital.   The 
resolution of information problems requires 
carefully designed control mechanisms such as 
appropriate contracts, courts to enforce these 
contracts, corporate governance rules, and financial 
intermediaries willing to act as corporate monitors. 
These mechanisms may either reduce the amount of 
information needed by the investors and 
intermediaries or may reduce the cost of collecting 
it.  The acuteness of the information problems in 
emerging financial markets has been an escalating 
concern for global investors as the share of 
emerging market equities and bonds in global 
portfolio allocations grew substantially over the last 
decade.  There is no sign of reversal in this trend as 
private capital flows in these countries gain further 
momentum in light of promising demographics and 
high growth prospects in emerging markets.  
The literature on information problems in 
financial markets suggests that prevalence of 
information problems create a more conducive 
environment for the development of debt markets 
rather than public equity markets.  In essence, 
equity investments are far more information 
intensive than debt, simply because equity investors 
own the residual claims on the company.  
Accordingly, they should be fully aware of the 
range of risks and opportunities facing the firm. 
This difficult task requires a complex screening 
assignment which is unlikely to be fulfilled by the 
average investor.  Therefore, the access to equity 
markets require significant support from a range of 
institutions (eg underwriters, institutional investors 
and brokers), which should collectively provide 
objective information about the company prospects.  
It is no accident that the abundance of financial 
information and its effective dissemination is an 
invariable characteristic of developed equity 
markets where external equity constitutes a 
significant source of capital for corporations. 
In the absence of such infrastructure, debt 
emerges as a practical and viable alternative to 
equity.  Indeed debt contracts exist primarily to 
overcome information problems such as the ones 
encountered in equity markets. Unlike equity, debt 
creates simple, fixed obligations whose promised 
cash flows are the same regardless of how well or 
badly firm performs. The claims are in principle 
enforceable and almost everywhere debt holders are 
in a stronger position than holders of public equity 
to obtain their return in an environment of imperfect 
information.   
The extent of informational asymmetry 
also determines the structure of debt markets. 
Relatively sophisticated debt securities such as 
bonds, notes and commercial papers are less likely 
to develop in environments characterized by 
inadequate informational infrastructure.  Despite 
well defined cash flow rights, buyers of debt 
securities still need to feel that either they are 
themselves well informed or that some institution 
such as a rating agency is able to inform them 
indirectly about the company prospects. Banks in 
contrast generate their own private information and 
are thus the dominant suppliers of debt finance 
when public information is inadequate. 
Consequently, banks play a far larger role in 
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markets where publicly available information is 
limited.    
Informational asymmetries constitute an 
impediment in development of financial markets. 
Emerging markets suffer from this consequence. 
Information problems in emerging markets led to 
development of bank centered financial systems and 
left corporations with limited choice and variety of 
financial resources.  Despite renewed attempts to 
jumpstart equity market development in emerging 
markets, relatively slow evolution of the 
institutional infrastructure limits widespread use of 
equity markets to finance growth.  A natural 
outcome of this is over reliance on the internal 
funds and high cost of capital due to limitations of 
domestic financial markets. Because of rampant 
information problems, and infrastructure issues, 
equity is still very costly.   Therefore, a growing 
number of EM companies  attempt to overcome the 
limitations of domestic financial markets by 
subscribing to more stringent disclosure 
requirements in more developed financial markets 
particularly by accessing tools such as American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs). ADR issuance is 
considered to be a strong signal to the market that 
the issuing company is ready for disclosure and 
compliance.   
The commitment to increased levels of 
disclosure is expected to reduce the potential 
informational asymmetries between the 
management of the firm and its shareholders or 
among buyers and sellers of the firm’s shares.  The 
voluntary disclosure reduces the risk borne by the 
investors and increases liquidity of firm’s stock by 
attracting larger group investors, who are more 
confident that the stock transactions occur at fair 
prices.  Voluntary disclosure can also lower the cost 
of information acquisition for analysts and hence 
increase the supply of information about the 
company, reinforcing further reductions in 
informational asymmetry.  As a result, EM firms 
committed to disclosure reduce their external cost 
of capital, and capitalize on the growth prospects in 
their respective markets.  
Such a move by an EM firm theoretically 
has some value implications. In other words, in 
general commitment to good corporate governance 
should create value for the existing shareholders of 
the firm.  The announcement and more importantly 
verification of such behavior should result in a 
decline in risk premium and therefore an increase in 
value.  A number of empirical studies verify this 
expected increase in firm value in the context of 
event studies by analyzing the returns around the 
ADR listing (Miller 1999, Forrester and Karolyi 
2000). 
The subscription to higher standards of 
disclosure by issuing ADR in the US market is 
expected to generate the effects discussed above. 
Klapper and Love (2002) suggest that foreign firms 
issuing ADRs in the US on average have better 
operating performance and they attribute this 
finding to better corporate governance structures 
emerging as a result compliance to more stringent 
US disclosure requirements.    We argue that a 
number of factors are expected to actively shape the 
resultant impact on performance and the value!  
First, there are different tiers of ADR markets with 
varying levels of disclosure and to best our 
knowledge there are no studies investigating the 
value implications for the issuing firms in the post 
listing period in relation to their commitment to 
better corporate governance.  Secondly, the 
empirical literature analyzing value implications 
around the ADR issues report that risk reduction is 
more prevalent for developed country firms with 
poor corporate governance standards.  Drawing on 
this literature, we argue that the impact of home 
country legal and regulatory environment should be 
considered. Finally, the extent of corruption in the 
home country setting would affect the commitment 
to better disclosure over the long run.  
This study focuses on the impact of 
corporate governance structures on firm 
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performance as to whether adherence to those 
standards creates market value and enhances 
performance for EMFs.  We also explore whether 
the impact of corruption level and legal systems in a 
firm’s home country affect the corporate 
governance structures of EMFs and subsequently 
affecting the market value and performance.   We 
use a sample of ADR issuing emerging market 
firms, and employ recently constructed company 
composite corporate governance metric along with 
some alternative corporate governance measures 
associated with the origin of the issuing firm. Our 
sample is composed of a cross-section of 54 EM 
firms in various industries from 9 countries (Brazil, 
Chile, India, Korea, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines, 
Taiwan and Thailand) primarily located in Asia and 
Latin America. Although the ADR literature 
primarily focuses on the impact of subscription to 
US disclosure requirements, such as increased 
exposure to the US capital market, and increased 
liquidity in equity through higher trading volumes, 
we contend that company and country specific 
corporate governance standards play a significant 
role in the risk reduction and ensuing value capture.    
The study is organized as follows:   
Section two of the paper presents a review of the 
relevant literature. Section three focuses on 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) governance 
benchmarks.   Section four discusses the data and 
methodology. Section five presents empirical 
findings and finally section six concludes the paper 
with closing remarks. 
II. Corporate	  Governance,	  Performance	  and	  	  Value	  Linkage	  
There is a growing body of literature in 
finance providing evidence on the linkage between 
corporate governance practices, corruption, legal 
infrastructure and firm performance and value.  
Doidge et.al (2001) show that home country 
characteristics defining governance structures such 
as inadequate investor rights and protection of 
minority interests are associated with poor 
performance and lower value.  In a parallel study 
Dowell, Hart and Yeung (2000) suggest that 
companies with no or little stringent adaptation to 
global governance standards have lesser market 
value.  In a study focusing on emerging market 
firms Klapper and Love (2002) argue that 
inefficient corporate governance structures and poor 
legal infrastructure increase risks associated with 
emerging market investments.  In a single country 
study, Black, Jang and Kim (2003) examine the 
effects of corporate governance structures on the 
market value of Korean firms and suggest that 
corporate governance is a significant dynamic in 
explaining the market value of Korean public 
companies.  Similarly, Black (2001) finds a robust 
relationship between the market value and corporate 
governance of a small sample of Russian firms.  
A related body of research, which mainly 
includes firms from the United States and Western 
Europe focuses on ownership structure and 
shareholders rights and their impact on the firm 
value.    La Porta et.al (1999) and La Porta et.al 
(2000) emphasize the value implications of 
potential conflicts of interest between the 
controlling and minority shareholders and insiders 
and outsiders when there is little or no transparency.   
When the interests of those who control the firm 
differ from the interests of those who supply the 
firm with external finances, the predicament 
evolves into principal agent problem and the 
ensuing agency costs have significant negative 
impact on firm value. Particularly interesting 
implications of the agency costs engendered by lack 
of transparency are the dividend policy and 
company’s ability to exploit growth opportunities. 
The authors demonstrate that firms operating in 
countries, where minority shareholders are better 
protected, pay higher dividends. Those firms that 
experience faster growth pay lower dividends than 
the slower growing firms.  This illustrates that when 
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the shareholders are legally protected they are likely 
to wait since the investment opportunities are good. 
Conversely, poorly protected shareholders prefer 
not to wait no matter what the investment 
conditions are. This imperative leads to massive 
misallocation of funds, and in turn affects the firm 
value.   Such conflicts of interest emanating from 
lack of transparency and inadequate regulatory 
safeguards to protect minority shareholders are 
endemic in emerging markets with non-negligible 
value implications. 
Other research examines corporate 
governance and firm value by focusing on the issue 
of transparency from investors’ perspective.  Perotti 
and Von Thadden (1998) suggest that although 
corporate transparency has both strategic 
advantages and disadvantages, in general it has 
positive value implications since investors are able 
to receive meaningful information concerning their 
investments.    
Recent proliferation of literature on 
economic implications of corruption suggests that 
private firms are entangled in the process as they 
take advantage of administrative corruption, involve 
in public procurement kickbacks and state capture .  
Xun (2002), examines the relationship between 
corporate governance and corruption. His findings 
suggest that poor corporate governance standards 
contribute to the proliferation of corruption by 
reducing transparency and impair the interests of 
investors.  In countries with poor corporate 
governance practices, corruption develops into a 
transparency issue.  Corruption may falsify the 
information received by the investors and the 
insiders may be treated preferentially through asset 
diversion, transfer prices and theft.   Consequently, 
impaired investor trust exacerbated by poor 
corporate governance standards and corruption raise 
the cost of capital, negatively affect the operating 
performance and reduce value.   
Finally, a growing body of literature 
indicates that variations in home country legal 
structure and the laws that protect investor across 
nations have significant impact on corporate 
governance mechanisms as well as ownership 
structure, dividend payout, cost of external finance 
and market valuations ((La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Vishny (1999); Klapper and Love, (2002)).  
While in some countries investor protection laws 
may not be binding since some firms may decline 
specific provisions, others, such as ADR issuing 
firms may implement additional provisions to 
improve investor protection rights by increasing 
disclosure, instituting better functioning boards and 
impose disciplinary means to ensure the rights of 
minority shareholders. Klapper and Love (2002) 
find that corporate governance structures are 
positively related to country level measures of 
investor protection and suggest that it is crucial for 
firms from countries with weak legal systems to 
adopt better corporate governance practices. 
Similarly, Black (2001) suggests that corporate 
governance structures of firms in developing 
countries can have larger effects, since these 
countries may have weaker rules. 
III. Data	  and	  Methodology	  
Data 
Our sample includes 54 companies from 9 
emerging market countries with ADR issues in US.  
Our sample firms originate mostly from Asia and 
Latin America. Accounting data to measure firm 
performance was compiled from DataStream 
International.  The governance data which includes 
S&P’s Corporate Governance Index and Composite 
Company Governance Scores (CGS) were obtained 
from Standard and Poor’s.  CGS is rated from 1 to 
10 – 10 being highest adherence to corporate 
governance standards by firms. Corruption scores 
were obtained form Transparency International.  
The data for legal structures of firms is obtained 
from the Institute of Corporate Governance at Yale 
University. 
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Methodology 
a.  Performance Measures: 
We use several performance proxies based 
on accounting data. These performance proxies are 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE).  All return indicators are based on the 
earnings before interest taxes and depreciation 
(EBITD) due to its neutrality to depreciation 
methods, leverage and tax treatment.  While all 
three indicators measure management’s operating 
efficiency, they represent returns on different 
sources of capital.   
We also use Tobin’s Q which is an 
important and widely accepted measure of corporate 
performance. Tobin’s-Q is defined as the ratio of 
market value of the firm to the replacement cost of 
its assets.  We employed Doidge, Karolyi and 
Stulz’s (2001) approximation to calculate the Q 
ratio: 
 
 
     Where TA  is the book value of the total 
assets of the firm, BVE is the book value of the 
firm’s equity  and MVE is the product of a firm’s 
share price and the number of outstanding common 
shares.   This indicator is employed to explain a 
number of diverse corporate phenomena such as 
cross-sectional differences in investment and 
diversification decisions, the relationship between 
managerial equity ownership and firm value.  We 
are particularly interested in using Tobin’s-Q to 
gain comparative insights on the effectiveness 
variant corporate governance practices adopted by 
emerging market firms on the firm value. 
b. Control Variables: 
We use size and leverage as control 
variables since their significance is empirically 
well established in literature addressing 
performance and value issues. While logarithm 
of sales and total assets are used as alternate 
size proxies, debt ratio is used as a measure of 
leverage. 
Corporate Governance Measures 
Our main corporate governance measure 
is Standard and Poor’s Corporate Governance 
Scores (CGI).  This index offers a detailed 
measure of a company’s corporate governance 
standards by reference to global practices.  
Standard & Poor’s corporate governance 
profiles assign scores to companies according to 
their global practices.  The assigned scores 
range from 1 to 10, and 10 corresponds to best 
corporate governance practices.  S&P Total 
Decile Scores are employed as the general 
corporate governance index S&P corporate 
governance index is composed of three sub-
indices which collectively determine the overall 
CGI score.  These three subcategory indices 
address various aspects of corporate 
governance.  Sub-index-1 focuses on ownership 
structure and investor relations; sub-index-2 
addresses financial transparency and 
information disclosure; and finally sub-index-3 
measures the board, management and 
governance processes.   
More specifically, ownership structure 
and investor relations sub-index is concerned 
with the role of stakeholders in corporate 
governance and equitable treatment of 
shareholders and it includes: (1) Fairness to 
minority shareholders in protecting against 
fraud, self-dealing or other insider wrongdoing; 
(2) Responsibility of the corporation as a 
member of society to abide by the laws and act 
with regard to society’s needs.  Corporate laws 
and regulations are also included in this 
subcategory.  Financial transparency and 
information disclosure sub-index focuses on 
transparency and improved disclosure of 
accurate and timely information. Finally, board 
and management and processes sub-index is 
concerned with the rights of the shareholders 
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and accountability of management through 
effective oversight based on a balance of power 
between the board of directors, managers, 
shareholders and the auditor. 
Legal System Proxies 
In an attempt to explore the linkage 
between the Corporate Governance structure of 
a firm and the legal structure of its home 
country, we developed a legal system proxy. 
We loaded 28 variables used by Lopez de 
Silanes to describe a country’s legal structure 
into four principal components, namely  Legal 
Structure, Shareholder Protection, Efficiency 
and Country Risk .  
Corruption Index 
The corporate governance scores of 
individual countries are obtained from 
Transparency International.  The ratings are 10 
to 1.  The score 1 indicates the highest level of 
corruption.  
a. Empirical Models: 
We use several alternative specifications 
to explore the impact of corporate governance, 
corruption and legal systems on the firm 
performance and value.  
Our first specification uses Tobin’s-q as a 
value metric. In addition to the Corporate 
Governance Index (CGI) composite score, we 
use variables to control for the size and the 
leverage. 
TQ =  0 +  1 CGI +  2 LEV +  3 
ln(SALES) +     (1) 
We also check the significance of the CG 
sub-indices by using the following 
specification:  
TQ = β0 + β1 Sub1 + β2 Sub2 + β3 Sub3 
+ β4 (LEV )+ β5 ln(SALES)+ε  (2) 
Pricing inefficiencies and  high volatility 
in emerging markets  raise some questions 
about Tobin’s-Q as a reliable value metric or 
performance measure. Therefore, we use ROA 
and ROE as alternative performance measures. 
Our specifications take the following form: 
ROA = β0 + β1 CGI + β2 LEV + β3 
ln(SALES) + ε   (3) 
ROA = β0 + β1 Sub1 + β2 Sub2 + β3 
Sub3 + β4 (LEV) + β5 ln(SALES)+ε  (4) 
ROE = β0 + β1 CGI + β2 LEV + β3 
ln(SALES) + ε   (5) 
ROE = β0 + β1 Sub1 + β2 Sub2 + β3 
Sub3 + β4 (LEV) + β5 ln(SALES)+ε  (6) 
In order to explore regional and industry 
patterns we use region and industry dummies.  
LA_DUMMY = 0 if the firm belongs to 
an  Asian country and 1 if it belongs to a  Latin 
American country.  
We classified firms into  three types of 
industries based on their two digit SIC codes: i) 
Diversified ii) Service Industry and iii) High-
tech Industry 
DUMMY_SI = 1 if industry is Service 
Industry0 if the industry is High-tech industry 
DUMMY_DI = 1 if industry represents 
Diversified  
0 if the industry is High – Tech Industry 
With the inclusion of regional and 
industry dummies, we use the following 
specifications:  
TQ = β0 + β1 CGI + β2 LEV + β3 
ln(SALES) + β4LA_DUMMY+ β3 
DUMMY_SI+ β5 DUMMY_DI +ε   (7) 
TQ = β0 + β1 Sub1 + β2 Sub2 + β3 Sub3 
+ β4 (LEV )+ β5 ln(SALES)+ 
β6LA_DUMMY+ β7 DUMMY_SI+ β8 
DUMMY_DI +ε  (8) 
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ROA = β0 + β1 CGI + β2 LEV + β3 
ln(SALES) + β4LA_DUMMY+ β3 
DUMMY_SI+ β5 DUMMY_DI +ε   (9) 
ROA = β0 + β1 Sub1 + β2 Sub2 + β3 
Sub3 + β4 (LEV )+ β5 ln(SALES)+ 
β6LA_DUMMY+ β7 DUMMY_SI+ β8 
DUMMY_DI +ε  (10) 
We also explored the impact of legal 
system and the corruption on the firm 
performance  by using the following 
specification.   
TQ = β0 + β1 LEV + β2 ln(SALES) + β3 
CGI +β4CI   + β5 Legal Structure + 
β6Efficiency  + β7 Country Risk + β8Share 
holders protection  (11) 
ROA = β0 + β1 LEV + β2 ln(SALES) + 
β3 CGI +β4CI   + β5 Legal Structure + 
β6Efficiency  + β7 Country Risk + β8Share 
holders protection  (12) 
Value Creation 
We utilize the OLS method to address the 
research hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Corporate governance 
structure of a emerging market MNE affects its 
market value (MV).  
Hypothesis 2: The level of Corruption in a 
country affects the market value of an emerging 
market MNE. 
Hypothesis 3:  Legal system/ structure in a 
country affects the corporate governance structure 
of an emerging market MNE, thereby affecting the 
market value of the firm.. 
IV. Empirical	  Findings	  
Data Analysis and Methodology 
OLS Results for Tobin’s q and Corporate 
Governance, Corruption and Legal Structures: 
a. In order to find whether Corporate 
Governance structure of a firm affects its market 
value, a linear regression model is chosen: 
TQ = β0 + β1 CGI + ε  
where TQ stands for Tobin’s q, which is 
utilized as a proxy for market value. And CGI 
stands for Corporate Governance Index.  The results 
as follows: 
VARIABLES   T R2 ADJ R2 F 
Tobin Q Vs CGI 
  CGI 3.52E-01 2.53E+00 0.124 0.124 6.378 
 
The F-value is high and the t-statistic is 
greater than 2. Therefore, the above regression 
demonstrates that as Governance score increases, 
the market value increases by 35.2%. Since a high 
number for CGI ranking indicates good governance, 
we find that as firms implement strong governance 
practices, their market values increase.  Therefore, 
the results support Hypothesis 1. 
b. It may be possible that the firm’s 
profitability may affect the market value. Therefore, 
to control for the profitability effect we add the 
EBIT/SALES variable into the model.  
TQ = β0 + β1 CGI + β2 EBIT/SALES+ ε 
The following table shows the results of the 
regression: 
VARIABLES   T R2 
ADJ 
R2 F 
Tobin Q Vs CGI,EBIT/SALES 
 CGI 
4.54E-
01 2.83E+00 0.165 0.124 4.043 
 EBIT/SALES -0.172 -1.072    
 
The adjusted R-square remains the same 
indicating that the added variable does not 
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contribute much in explaining the variation in the 
data. Firm’s profitability (measured by 
EBIT/SALES) is negatively correlated with TQ.  
The T-statistic of β1 increases, which strengthens 
the variable in the model. The above regression 
displays that as Governance score of a firm 
increases, its market value increases by 45.4%.  
Hence the results from this regression as well 
support Hypothesis 1.   
c. The size of a firm may also affect the 
market value. To control for this effect, we add the 
ln (assets) into the model. We use ln(assets) as a 
proxy for firm size. 
TQ = β0 + β1 CGI + β2 EBIT/SALES + β3 
ln(ASSETS) + ε 
 
VARIABLES   T R2 
ADJ 
R2 aF 
TOBIN Q Vs CGI,EBIT/SALES,LN(ASSETS) 
 CGI 0.536 3.19E+00 0.206 0.147 3.467 
 
      
EBIT/SALES 
-
0.218 
-
1.35E+00    
 
     
LN(ASSETS) 0.217 1.45E+00    
 
The adjusted R-square has increased indicating that 
the added variable contributes in explaining the 
variation in the data. Size of the firm (measured by 
ln(ASSETS)) is positively correlated with TQ.  The 
above regression shows that as Governance score 
increases, the market value increases by 53.6%; 
thereby, it supports Hypothesis 1. 
d. Ln(sales) could also be a measure of firm’s 
size. Hence we regress with ln(sales) instead of 
ln(assets). 
TQ = β0 + β1 CGI + β2 EBIT/SALES + β3 
ln(SALES) + ε 
 
 
VARIABLES   
T
T R2 
A
AD JR2 
a
F 
TOBIN Q Vs CGI,EBIT/SALES,LN(SALES) 
   CGI 
0
.466 
2
.63E+00 
0
.165 
0
.103 
2
.64 
  
 
EBIT/S
ALES 
-
0.17 
-
1.04E+00       
  
 
LN(SA
LES) 
0
.027 
1
.62E-01       
 
The adjusted R-square has decreased indicating that 
the added variable does not contribute in explaining 
the variation in the data. Hence we take Ln(assets) 
as a better proxy for firm size.  
e. The investor’s confidence of a firm might 
result in a greater market value. To control for this 
effect BV/MV is added to the model.  
TQ = β0 + β1 CGI + β2 EBIT/SALES + β3 
ln(SALES) + β4 BV/MV + ε 
VARIABLES   T R2 
ADJ 
R2 F 
  TOBIN Q Vs CGI,EBIT/SALES,LN(ASSETS),MV TO BV 
  CGI 
3.345E-
03 3.975 0.525 0.477 10.785 
  
 
EBIT/SALES 
-1.81E-
02 
-
2.038       
  LN(ASSETS) 
3.323E-
03 3.000       
  MV TO BV 
1.819E-
02 5.117       
From the above regression we observe that the 
model improves. Adjusted R-square has increased. 
MV/BV explains 1.81% of the variation in the data.  
 
 
 
 Corporate Governance and Firm Value in Emerging Markets An Empirical Analysis of ADR Issuing Emerging 
Market Firms 
Emerging Markets Journal | P a g e  | 46 
Volume 2 (2012)   |   ISSN 2158-8708 (online)   |   DOI 10.5195/emaj.2012.18   |   http://emaj.pitt.edu 
f. Next Tobin’s Q is regressed against the 
Corruption index to find whether corruption affects 
the market value of a firm.  
TQ = β0 + β1 Corruption Index + ε 
The results of the regression are as follows: 
VARIABLES   T R2 ADJ R2 F 
TOBIN Q Vs CORRUPTION INDEX 
  CORRUPTION INDEX -0.07 -4.71E+00 0.005 -0.017 0.222 
 
      There seems to be a negative relation between corruption and TQ, indicating that as corruption scores go 
up (high corruption), the market value of the firm decreases. The findings state that high corruption level within a 
country decreases firm value. The results support hypothesis 2.  
g. To find the relationship between Market Value (Tobin’s Q) and the 4 principal components: structure, 
efficiency, country risk and shareholders protection the following model is utilized: 
TQ = β0 + β1 Legal Structure + β2 Efficiency + β3 Country Risk + β4 Share holders protection + ε 
 
 
Judging from the above regression, it can be noted that the type of legal structure explains 94.6% of the variation in 
the data. (Type of legal structure: depending whether the country adheres to Swiss Law, German Law or British 
Law).   As the efficiency of the legal structure increases, the market value increases by 2.5%. As country risk 
increases the market value increases 138% and as shareholders’ protection increases, market value of the firm 
decreases by 67.6%. The results from this regression support hypothesis 3, illustrating that legal structure in a 
country, country risk, and shareholder protection do affect firm value.  Here some effects on market value are 
negative. 
h. The effect of the three sub indices used in the computation of Corporate Governance scores on Tobin’s Q is 
obtained from the following regression: 
TQ = β0 + β1 Sub1 + β2 Sub2 + β3 Sub3 + ε 
 
 
VARIABLES   T R2 ADJ R2 F 
TOBIN Q VS LEGAL STRUCTURE,EFFEICIENCY,COUNTRY RISK,SHARE HOLDERS 
PROTECTION 
  LEGAL STRUCTURE -0.946 -3.48E+00 0.388 0.33 6.656 
  EFFICIENCY 0.025 0.207       
  COUNTRY RISK 1.38 4.564       
  SHARE HOLDERS PROTECTION -0.676 -3.946       
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VARIABLES   T R2 ADJ R2 F 
TOBIN Q VS SUB1,SUB 2,SUB 3 
  
 SUB1  - Ownership Structure and Investor 
Relations  0.875 4.567 0.355 0.309 7.873 
  
 SUB 2  - Financial Transparency and Information 
Disclosure -0.04 -0.234       
   SUB 3 - Board and Management and processes -0.442 -2.049       
 
From the above regression it can be inferred that as Ownership structure and Investor relations 
scores increase, market value increases by 87.5%. High Financial Transparency and Information 
disclosure scores cause a decrease in the Market Value by 4%. An increase in Board and Management 
process scores causes the decrease in the market value by 44.2%.  The results support hypothesis 1. 
However, Ownership structure and Investor relations have positive effect on firm market value, and sub 
category 2 - Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure, and sub category 3 – Board and 
Management process have negative effects on firm market value.  
b. In order to find whether Corporate Governance structure of a firm across the geographical region 
affects its market value, the following linear regression model is employed: 
TQ =  0 +  1 CGI +  2 LA_DUMMY +   
LA_DUMMY = 0 if the firm is in Asia and 1 if in Latin America. This model assumes that the rate 
of change of market value with respect to CGI is a constant across the two countries. 
 
The results are the following: 
VARIABLES   T R2 ADJ R2 F 
Tobin Q Vs CGI & COUNTRY DUMMY 
 CONST 0.978 298.043    
 CGI 2.259E-03 2.819 .318 .287 10.242 
 LA_DUMMY 1.352E-02 3.533    
 
The two equations obtained are as follows: 
For firms in Latin America, 
TQ = 1.978 +2.259E-03 CGI + ε 
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For firms in Asia 
TQ = 0.978 +2.259E-03 CGI + ε 
 
The above equations suggest that the mean of the Tobin’s Q in Latin America is higher than those of Asia. This 
could be attributed to investor’s perceptions or any such external variables outside the scope of this research. 
j. In order to find whether Corporate Governance structure of a firm across the industry affects its market value, 
the following linear regression model is chosen: 
TQ = β0 + β1 CGI + β2 DUMMY_MI + β3 DUMMY_SI + ε 
The above model assumes that the rate of change of market value with respect to CGI in the two geographical areas 
is a constant. Three types of industries are identified as i) Mixed Industry ii) Service Industry and iii) High-tech 
Industry 
Where, 
DUMMY_SI = 1 if industry is Service Industry 
   0 if the industry is High-tech industry  
   
DUMMY_MI = 1 if industry represents Mixed Industry 
     0 if the industry is High – Tech Industry 
VARIABLES   T R2 ADJ R2 F 
Tobin Q Vs CGI & INDUSTRY DUMMY 
 CGI 8.829E-04 1.023 .372 .328 8.474 
 DUMMY_MI 1.376E-02 4.049    
 DUMMY_SI 5.217E-03 1.809    
 
Assuming that the rate of change of market value with respect to CGI in the two geographical areas is a constant, 
the following three equations can be obtained from the above regression for the three industries: 
1. Service industry 
TQ = (0.978 + 5.217E-03) + 8.829E-04 CGI + ε 
       = 0.983217 + 8.829E-04 CGI + ε 
2. Mixed Industry 
TQ = (0.978 +1.376E-02) + 8.829E-04 CGI + ε 
      = 0.99176+ 8.829E-04 CGI + ε 
3.  High – Tech Industry 
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TQ = (0.978) + 8.829E-04 CGI + ε 
The results indicate that the mean market value of firms in the Mixed Industry category is higher than the other two 
categories as given by the y-intercept. The mean market value of the firms in the Service industry is higher that the 
ones in the high-tech industry. 
V. Conclusion	  
The results support a positive correlation 
between Tobin’s q (market value of the firm) and 
total corporate governance scores of emerging 
market MNEs.  Thereby supporting the hypothesis – 
corporate governance structures of emerging market 
MNEs affect their firm value and value creation. 
When there is better corporate governance within 
the firms, the market value of firms increase.   
When we consider the sub-indices 
separately in the regression model, it is inferred that 
as Ownership structure and Investor relations’ 
scores increase, market value of a firm increases as 
well.   However, High Financial Transparency and 
Information disclosure scores cause a decrease in 
the firm market value.  Additionally, an increase in 
Board and Management process scores, causes a 
decrease in the market value of the firm. 
The results also report that there is a 
negative relationship between Tobin’s q and 
corruption, indicating that as corruption scores go 
up (high corruption level within a country), the 
market value of the firm decreases. The findings 
state that high corruption level within a given 
country decreases firm value. 
The type of legal structure explains 94.6% 
of the variation in the data. (Type of legal structure: 
depending whether the country adheres to Swiss 
Law, German Law or British Law).  As the 
efficiency of the legal structure increases, the 
market value increases by 2.5%. As country risk 
increases the market value increases 138% and as 
shareholders’ protection increases, market value of 
the firm decreases by 67.6%. 
This research further contributes to the 
studies relating corporate governance and market 
value, as it confirms a positive relationship between 
the two variables.  The research also includes 
control variables that were not previously used in 
other studies. Therefore it can be said that it is more 
robust than the other studies.  Our findings suggest 
that it is imperative for firms to enhance their 
corporate governance standards in order to increase 
firm value. The findings also suggest that investors 
need to be extra cautious when investing in firms 
with less stringent corporate governance 
mechanisms. Future studies in this area can be 
expanded by incorporating other variables to control 
for factors outside of the scope of this study.
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